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Binance says fake job interview preceded $6.34 billion theft

Binance says a fake job interview helped attackers steal $6.34 billion over months, showing how compromised staff and internal tools exposed wallet systems.

By Crypto Docket Newsroom#1377504 min read

Binance says fake job interview preceded $6.34 billion theft

Binance says attackers stole about $6.34 billion in digital assets after a months-long campaign that began with a fake job interview, turning an employee’s routine coding assignment into a route toward the exchange’s wallet systems. The company’s initial incident report says the campaign also involved malicious software, compromised devices and an internal AI tool. Binance has replenished 98% of affected tokens and says it will absorb the loss, while the investigation and independent review are still underway.

The scale makes this different from a one-step phishing attempt: the reported route ran from a planted foothold in June to stolen credentials and unauthorized wallet signing in October. Binance says roughly $2.85 billion has been frozen or intercepted, subject to reconciliation and market price changes. Those figures describe assets affected by the incident and the recovery effort; the company says some illiquid assets still need to be purchased.

How did a job interview reach Binance’s wallet systems?

Binance says the operation’s first identified access came in June, when an engineer downloaded a tampered Homebrew installation while looking for an AI coding tool. The security team detected it, replaced the device and rotated credentials, but the attacker learned the engineer’s role and colleagues on the wallet infrastructure team.

In September, another engineer was contacted on a legitimate job-hunting platform by someone posing as a project director at a fictitious company. After two interviews, including a live video call and a second interview in a social chat app, the engineer was asked to download a coding assignment. Binance says its repository carried previously undetected malware that replaced a development tool component, ran commands and communicated with an attacker-controlled server.

On Oct. 20, the attacker used the compromised computer and an internal AI tool to reach two wallet engineers’ devices, Binance says. The attacker then found a container deployment permission token. On Oct. 29, stolen credentials were used to deploy a container and run a script against the wallet signing service. CoinDesk’s account of Binance’s briefing says the FBI attributed the attack to North Korea; Binance’s report also cites the FBI’s attribution.

Why did suspending withdrawals not stop the transfers?

The attackers used Ethereum’s EIP-7702 authorization mechanism to give a smart contract partial execution rights over a hot wallet, Binance says. That permission let transactions proceed outside the exchange’s normal withdrawal process. Binance suspended withdrawals and coordinated with partners to freeze assets, but those steps did not automatically remove authorizations already recorded on-chain.

The exchange says the wallet’s multiparty-computation setup meant there was no single private key to revoke the permissions immediately. Binance had to develop a separate procedure to clear them; it says the final unauthorized transfer settled at 23:56 UTC on Oct. 29, and the delegation was cleared at 00:10 UTC the next day. The design offers distributed control over signing, but the incident shows the response trade-off: existing on-chain permissions can require additional steps to unwind even after normal withdrawals are suspended.

What will show whether the response has closed the gap?

Binance says it rebuilt the affected wallet system and internal AI tool, replaced devices, retired credentials and tokens, and expanded device controls and behavioral detection. It also plans an independent cybersecurity review and more investment in endpoint and developer-environment security. The company said it detected and prevented 57 suspected North Korea-linked threats this year, but the figure does not establish how many resembled this operation or whether the changes will catch a repeat.

The next signals are the independent review’s findings, the reconciliation of frozen and replenished assets, and any further disclosure about how the attacker retained access after the June device was replaced. Until then, the central question is whether tighter controls can connect employee-device alerts to the wallet permissions and deployment tokens that turn a compromised workstation into exchange-wide risk.

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